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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT--ONE FOOT IN THE
GRAVE: THE AGONIZING DEATH OF VOLUNTARY CLEANUP UNDER
CERCLA. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157
(2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
Considered by some to be a less-than-perfect exercise in legislative
drafting, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)l has been the subject of much litigation
since its creation. 2 Because a determination of liability could result in bank-
ruptcy for a responsible party, attorneys desperately sought mechanisms for
avoiding, or at least limiting, costs of cleanup incurred by their clients.'
With one such mechanism, responsible parties that had voluntarily cleaned
up a contaminated site tried to secure at least a partial recovery for the costs
incurred because of the cleanup.4 Some courts, though varied in their reason-
ing, found an implied right of contribution within the statute that would al-
low such recovery.5 Later, Congress codified an express right of contribu-
tion that allowed responsible parties to seek an equitable allocation of
cleanup costs between themselves and other responsible parties.6 However,
some question remained as to the prerequisites for bringing such a suit.7
When Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.8 came before the
United States Supreme Court, there was no uniform understanding among
the courts as to whether, in the absence of a civil action, a party partially
responsible for a contaminated site could obtain contribution from other
parties that contributed to the subject contamination.9
This note first provides a brief description of the facts in Cooper Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., followed by a description of the backdrop
leading to the Supreme Court's consideration of the question presented.1° It
then explores the holding and rationale of the Court in deciding the case,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
2. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4-6
(1993).
3. See id.
4. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 162 (2004).
5. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
7. See Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. 157.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
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and lastly, includes a commentary on the decision's potential effect on vol-
untary cleanup." The discussion that follows revolves mainly around two
sections of CERCLA-§ 113(f)(1), which allows contribution between par-
ties held liable under CERCLA, and § 107(a), which defines classes of
"covered persons" and allows cost recovery for necessary cleanup under
certain circumstances. 2 The significance section includes a short discussion
of § 113(f)(3)(B), which provides a contribution cause of action among par-
ties following an administrative or judicially approved settlement. 3
II. FACTS
In 1981, Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall") purchased four aircraft engine
maintenance properties in Texas from Cooper Industries, Inc. ("Cooper"). 14
The maintenance facilities were located throughout the Dallas metro area
and included Love Field, Carter Field, and Forest Park. 5 Prior to and during
Cooper's ownership, the property had been contaminated by spills of haz-
ardous substances and leaking underground storage tanks containing petro-
leum and hazardous substances. 6 The contamination continued after Avi-
all's purchase. 17 Several years later, Aviall discovered contamination from
petroleum and other hazardous substances on the property, which were at-
tributable to both it and Cooper. 8 Aviall disclosed this information to the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC), now the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. 9 The TNRCC told Aviall
that the site had to be cleaned up; otherwise, the TNRCC would bring an
enforcement action against Aviall. 20 However, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)-the primary CERCLA enforcement authority-never con-
tacted Aviall.2 ' Aviall subsequently began cleaning up the site in 1984 under
the supervision of the TNRCC, without the issuance of an enforcement ac-
22tion.
Aviall contacted Cooper in 1995 and requested reimbursement for the
cleanup. 3 Cooper refused to take responsibility for the costs incurred by
11. See infra Parts IV-V.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 163.
15. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 2001).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 163-64.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id.
21. Aviall Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d at 136.
22. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 164.
23. AviallServs., Inc., 263 F.3d at 136.
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Aviall.24 In 1997, after allegedly spending five million dollars on cleanup,
Aviall filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas against Cooper for the cost recovery associated with the
cleanup. 25 The court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper, holding
that Aviall could not sustain an action under § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA in the
absence of an enforcement action pursuant to § 106 or § 107(a).26 The court
also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Aviall's state law
claims, holding that those claims could be better handled in state court.27
Aviall had no better luck when arguing before the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 2' The court, sitting in a three-member panel, affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that § 113(f)(1) was unavailable to a potentially
responsible party (PRP) in the absence of an action in progress or completed
against it under § 107 or § 106 of CERCLA.29
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Aviall a hear-
ing en banc.3° The en banc court, with three dissenting judges, reversed and
remanded the district court's decision.3 The court interpreted the statutory
language of CERCLA that determines when a party may sue under §
113(f)(1) to be permissive, which the court said would further the purposes
of CERCLA, and it rejected the previous panel's holding that only a PRP
that has been the subject of litigation or an administrative order can obtain
relief under § 1 13(f)(1). 32
III. BACKGROUND
Once described as a "black hole that indiscriminately devours all who
come near it," CERCLA has been interpreted by the courts to include some
of the most frightening concepts of liability available under the United
States legal system.33 Creatures such as strict liability, joint and several li-
ability, successor liability, and (most frightening) retroactive liability lurk
around every comer searching for the deepest pocket available.34 With all
that is at stake, it is no wonder that so much time has been spent litigating
24. Complaint for Plaintiff at 15A, Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 520 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000) (No. 1926-D).
25. Aviall Servs., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520, at *17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Aviall Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d 134.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Availl Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
543 U.S. 157 (2004).
31. Id. at 681.
32. Id. at 679.
33. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 6-7.
34. See id.
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the finer points of CERCLA.35 The following section first discusses the ne-
cessity that led up to the enactment of CERCLA 6 Next, CERCLA concepts
relevant to this particular case are explained.37 This section ends with an
analysis of the district court and court of appeals's decisions leading up to
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
38
A. The Development of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Law in the United
States
1. The Need for Quick, Responsive Cleanup of Hazardous Sub-
stances
In response to increasing problems with improper disposal of hazard-
ous waste, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) 9 to ensure proper management of hazardous wastes in the
United States.4" RCRA, however, dealt only with current generation and
disposal of hazardous wastes.4 It did nothing to assist in the cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites.42
In 1978, public concern over hazardous waste sites came to a head with
the Love Canal incident.43 Buried chemicals seeping into the ground at Love
Canal, which was at that time a residential neighborhood, were thought to be
the cause of a variety of health problems, including birth defects.' Existing
law provided no remedy for the residents of Love Canal.45
It was evident that something had to be done to protect people from the
dangers of abandoned hazardous waste sites.46 In 1979, the EPA estimated
that there were 32,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste sites in the United
States.47 In response, Congress hastily passed CERCLA during the last
35. See generally Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. 157.
36. See infra Part III.A.1.
37. See infra Part III.A.2.
38. See infra Part III.B.
39. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000).
40. Elizabeth Ann Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An Examination of Real Es-
tate & Commercial Liability Under Superfund & SARA and Suggested Guidelines for the
Practitioner, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 381, 382 (1987).
41. Id. at 381-82.
42. Id. at 382-83.
43. Id. at 381.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 381-83.
46. Glass, supra note 40, at 381.
47. Id. at 383.
48. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
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days of the Ninety-Sixth Congress.49 CERCLA's two main purposes were to
"promote the prompt investigation and remediation of sites" and to "shift the
cost of investigating and remediating" to the parties responsible for the con-
tamination.5 °
CERCLA was Congress's answer to the problem of inactive hazardous
waste sites.51 It provided the EPA with a means by which to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites and/or force other "potentially responsible parties"
(PRP)52 to pay for the cleanup.53 CERCLA gave the EPA a funding mecha-
nism and the necessary authority to begin cleanup of contaminated sites
prior to determining the liability of various PRPs.54 PRPs constitute a de-
fined class of parties, or "covered persons," that have some connection with
the contaminated site.55 The different types of covered persons included
under § 107(a) of CERCLA are current and past owners and operators of a
facility in which hazardous substances were disposed or treated, transporters
of hazardous substances, and any person who arranged for hazardous sub-
stances to be transported, treated, or disposed.56 These covered persons are
responsible jointly and severally for all costs associated with the removal of
hazardous substances or remedial action taken by federal or state govern-
ment under CERCLA, as well as "any other necessary costs of response"
paid by "any other person. 57 Therefore, the EPA could hold a single PRP
liable for the entire cost of cleanup, thereby relieving the EPA of the bur-
densome task of locating and bringing actions against all PRPs.5  This
shifted the burden of locating other PRPs to the PRP held liable, providing
that PRP with a significant motive to find other parties to share the cost.59
2. Resolving Cost Recovery and Contribution Under CERCLA
Two separate issues soon arose concerning § 1 07.60 One issue regarded
whether a private party who is not subject to suit and who incurs cost due to
49. Glass, supra note 40, at 382-83.
50. Martin A. McCrory, Who's on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and
Protection, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 3, 6 (1999).
51. See Glass, supra note 40, at 382-83.
52. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 331, 337 (2004).
53. See Glass, supra note 40, at 383.
54. Steven G. Davison, Governmental Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 47, 48 (1997).
55. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
58. See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1054-55 (1994).
59. Id.
60. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 161-62 (2004).
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response action can seek cost recovery under § 107.61 The other issue con-
cerned whether § 107 allows for one PRP to seek contribution from other
PRPs for costs it incurred due to voluntary cleanup or cleanup mandated by
the government.6 2 Taking a closer look at how the courts have interpreted
the "any other person" 63 provision of § 107 helps to properly understand the
potential impact of the provision.
After the enactment of CERCLA, many courts found that private par-
ties who had not contributed to the contamination on a site should recover
those costs necessary for cleanup under § 107(a)(4)(B). 64 Deciding the
"seminal decision ' 65 for recognizing a federal common law right to contri-
bution, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania found in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.66 that a PRP
who had voluntarily cleaned up a site could sue other PRPs for cost recov-
ery.67 In City of Philadelphia, the court used both the language of the statute
and policy reasons to justify its conclusion that potentially liable parties
were not precluded from obtaining response CoStS. 68 The court reasoned that
since one of CERCLA's main objectives was to provide for "prompt
cleanup" of contaminated sites and to provide a means of "financing ...
private responses," it would frustrate that objective by not allowing parties
who could be liable under CERCLA to obtain cost recovery for their volun-
tary response costs. 69 Furthermore, the court found no reason in the statutory
language of the "any other person" provision 71 that would preclude a PRP
from fitting into that category.7'
Also, in Colorado v. Asarco, Inc.,72 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado found contribution under § 107 .7 The court held
that there was a common-law right to contribution through the legislative
61. Id. at 161.
62. Id. at 162.
63. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
64. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986);
Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311,318 (6th Cir. 1985).
65. Availl Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
543 U.S. 157 (2004).
66. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
67. Id. at 1142. The defendants in City of Philadelphia argued that the term "any other
person" could not include a person who was already a PRP. Id at 1141. Otherwise, the de-
fendants claimed, the result would be a "merry go round" of litigation. Id. at 1142. The court
rejected this claim. Id. It may have been somewhat important to the court's decision that
Philadelphia was arguably an innocent party, being a victim of illegal dumping. See id.
68. See City of Philadelphia, 544 F. Supp. 1135.
69. Id. at 1143-44.
70. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) (2000).
71. City of Philadelphia, 544 F. Supp. at 1142.
72. 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985).
73. Id. at 1489.
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history of CERCLA.74 Notably, the sources referred to by the court seem to
support a contribution cause of action by someone who has been held liable
under CERCLA.75 The court's policy reasoning also points to the right to
contribution only for a party that has already been sued.76 In fact, the court's
holding states that the party "will have a right to contribution in the event
that they are held jointly and severally liable.""
Later, however, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware clearly recognized the ability of a PRP to obtain cost recovery
under CERCLA.78 The court in United States v. New Castle County79 again
recognized a right to contribution that existed under federal common law
and was fashioned by the judiciary.8 ° More importantly, the court recognized
the importance of allowing PRPs to obtain recovery for costs associated
with voluntary cleanup.8 Eerily foretelling what was to come, the court ex-
plained the situation in which a party who voluntarily cleaned up a site
could become liable for the entire cost: "It is not hard to imagine that such a
system would discourage voluntariness but would instead invite responsible
individuals to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude with the hope that some other
responsible entity will eventually be the one sued by the Government under
§ 107(a) of the Act."82
Another problem that arose concurrently was how to distribute costs
between PRPs under § 107.83 In the early days of CERCLA, many courts
decided that suits between PRPs should be treated as actions for contribu-
tion, using equitable allocation under the federal common-law right to con-
tribution." The court in Asarco found that, although joint and several liabil-
ity were viable options of providing the means to clean up contaminated
sites, the legislative history of CERCLA clearly envisioned apportionment
of costs between PRPs, thereby allowing contribution.85
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1491.
76. Id. at 1489.
77. Id. at 1492 (emphasis added).
78. United States v. New Castle Co., 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D. Del. 1986).
79. 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986).
80. Id. at 1269.
81. Id. at 1264-65.
82. Id.
83. Richard 0. Faulk & Cynthia J. Bishop, There and Back Again: The Progression and
Regression of Contribution Actions Under CERCLA, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 323,324 (2005).
84. Id.
85. Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo. 1985).
2006]
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B. Enter the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
1. Codifying the Right to Contribution Among PRPs
While most courts recognized some form of contribution under § 107,
there was no firm agreement on the origin of authorization for this cause of
action.86 Some found it in the language of CERCLA; some found it as an
implied right, and others found it existing in federal common law.87
In response to differing opinions concerning contribution among PRPs
in the federal circuits, Congress amended CERCLA through the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).88 Through SARA,
PRPs had an express right of contribution under § 1 13(f)(1) as follows:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under § 9607(a) of this title, during or following any
civil action under § 9606 of this title or under § 9607(a) of this title.
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law.
In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under § 9606 of this title or § 9607 of this title.89
2. Two Routes of Recovery
After SARA, CERCLA included two possible routes for PRPs to ob-
tain recovery from other PRPs for costs resulting from voluntary cleanup:
the preexisting recovery action under § 107 and the new express contribu-
tion action under § 113(f). 90 This left the courts to decide whether § 107, §
113(f), or both allowed PRPs to sue other PRPs for costs resulting from
cleanup. 9'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals looked at the differences between §
107 and § 113(f) claims when called upon to rule on a combined claim in
OHM Remediation Services v. Evans Cooperage Co.92 OHM had performed
cleanup work for Louisiana Oil Recycle and Reuse at a contaminated site in
86. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1262.
87. Id.
88. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Faulk & Bishop, supra note 83, at
327.
89. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
90. See Faulk & Bishop, supra note 83, at 329.
91. Id.
92. 116 F.3d 1574 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Baton Rouge.93 Subsequently, Louisiana Oil went out of business, leaving
OHM unpaid on a three-million-dollar bill.94 OHM, seeking cost recovery,
sued Evans, a party who had contributed to contamination at the site.95 OHM
brought claims against Evans under both § 107 and § 113(f)(1). 9 6 Evans, in
turn, named other third-party defendants who named other third-party de-
fendants (seventy in all), including OHM.97 OHM, however, denied that it
was a PRP under CERCLA.98 The district court dismissed OHM's § 107
claim, holding that a party must have a "protectable interest" in the land in
question in order to sue.99 The district court also dismissed OHM's § 113(f)
claim, holding that OHM could not bring a § 113(f) claim unless it admitted
it was a PRP.'0
The court of appeals looked to the language of the "any other person"
provision and held that there was no such "protectable interest" element
required in a § 107 claim.' ' Since OHM had not yet been held liable itself
as a PRP, the court declined to address whether a PRP fits into that "any
other person" category.'02 The court also concluded that OHM was eligible
to bring an action under § 113(f)(1). 1°3 The court reasoned that since OHM
had been sued as a third-party defendant in this case, it was at least "poten-
tially liable," because it met the prerequisite of being a PRP, and, therefore,
it was able to bring an action for contribution under § 113(f)(1)).' o
Section 107 and § 113(f)(1) have distinct differences that must be ad-
dressed in order to fully understand the reasoning adopted by the various
federal courts.'0 5 Because § 107 allows for strict liability, one party suing
another party under § 107 need show only that the other party is a PRP un-
der § 107 in order to obtain cost recovery (perhaps even for the complete
cost of response), as fault is not a required element.10 6 However, under §
113(f)(1) the defending party may receive an "equitable allocation based on
care and fault."'0 7 Similarly, while § 107 allows for joint and several liability
93. Id. at 1577.
94. Id. at 1578.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. OHM was a PRP because it had previously sent ten drums of waste to the Louisi-
ana Oil facility. Id.
98. OHMRemediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1578.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1579-80.
102. Id. at 1582.
103. Id. at 1583.
104. OHMRemediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1582-83.
105. See McCrory, supra note 50, at 22-24.
106. Id. at 23.
107. Id.
20061
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in which the entire cost of cleanup may be allocated completely to one or
more PRPs, § 113(f)(1) makes defendants liable only for the contamination
they contributed to the site.' Therefore, when one PRP has covered more
than its share of the costs of cleanup, § 113(f)(1) allows it, through contribu-
tion, to recover from other PRPs the difference between the cleanup costs
for the contamination it actually contributed to the site and what it spent on
cleanup.' °9 Because of the possibility of one PRP being able to recover the
entire amount of cleanup costs from another PRP under § 107, rather than
apportioning costs, federal courts of appeals chose to use § 113(f)(1) in
cases in which the plaintiff was a PRP."0 Section 113(f)(1), by design, pro-
vided an action for contribution among tortfeasors, and it, therefore, pro-
vided for equitable allocation of costs."'
C. Enter Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
With most federal courts agreeing that § 113(f) was the exclusive rem-
edy for PRPs under CERCLA, the question remained as to whether a PRP
could recover its costs for voluntary cleanup under § 113(f) in the absence
of a civil action or settlement with the federal or state government." 2 This
was the question in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.' Aviall
brought suit against Cooper under § 113(f)(1) in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking contribution for its volun-
tary cleanup. 114
Aviall's complaint originally asserted two federal law claims-one for
contribution under § 113(f)(1) and one for cost recovery under § 107." 5
Later, however, Aviall amended its complaint to include only the § 113(f)(1)
claim, with § 107 being an element of that claim."6 The district court
108. Id.
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979) (explaining the mechanism of
contribution).
110. See Faulk & Bishop, supra note 83, at 330. One author has suggested that § 113
"contribution protection" is not all that great. See generally Brian D. Langa, Taken to the
Cleaners: Potentially Responsible Parties That Sign CERCLA Consent Decrees May Face
Unexpected Claims from Non-PRPs, 28 L.A. LAW. 30 (2005). Langa imagines a case in
which PRPs that have settled pursuant to an EPA agreement may still be sued under § 107 for
cost recovery by non-PRPs. Id.
111. See Faulk & Bishop, supra note 83, at 328.
112. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Availl Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. at 160-61 (2004).
113. Id.
114. Id at 164.
115. Id
116. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 15, 2000). Aviall maintained that Fifth Circuit precedent holding a "[§] 113 claim is
a type of [§] 107 claim" was the reason they amended their complaint to drop the § 107
claim. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 164. As we can see, this later came back to haunt
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granted summary judgment to Cooper, finding that a § 113(f)(1) claim was
unavailable to Aviall in the absence of some civil action brought against
it." 7 The court further reasoned that the saving clause of § 113(fJ(1) did not
remove the requirement for there to be some civil action pending or re-
solved, but, instead, it served only to not undermine claims outside of
CERCLA, such as claims under state law."'
The parties brought an appeal before a Fifth Circuit panel, which held
that the § 113(f)(1) claim was unavailable to Aviall in the absence of a civil
action under § 107 or a pending or adjudged administrative order under §
106.' The panel also reasoned that this holding was in line with congres-
sional intent to base contribution on common-law standards that require a
civil action to be pending or adjudged. 2 ° Furthermore, the panel did not
foresee its decision affecting voluntary cleanup, as many states have similar
environmental cleanup laws in place that allow cost recovery. 2' Judge
Jacques L. Weiner, Jr., in his dissent, found no reason to preclude a PRP that
had not been sued from obtaining contribution under § 113(f)(1). 2 Later,
when the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel's prior decision during a rehearing
en banc, Judge Weiner's dissenting opinion that a PRP could obtain contri-
bution from other PRPs even in the absence of a § 106 administrative order
or a § 107 civil action served as the template for the majority opinion.'23
The Fifth Circuit's holding was based in part upon Aviall's argument
that the saving clause in § 113(0(1) made certain that § 113(0(1) did not
take away a person's right to contribution in the absence of a civil action or
them. Id. Mr. Richard Faulk, attorney for Aviall, when questioned by the district court judge
regarding Aviall's amended complaint, answered that he was trying to "use 107 as an element
of the contribution cause of action under 113." Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Aviall
Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. 3:97-1926, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520 (N.D. Tex.
2000). Mr. Dale Stephenson, attorney for Cooper Industries in the district court, plainly stated
that he thought it "well established that to pursue a direct cause of action under [§] 107 you
have to be either an innocent party or the United States Government, and we [do not] have
that .... Id. at 3. Continuing, Mr. Stephenson stated that "Aviall [does not] dispute at all
that it polluted these properties, and [that is] why it [cannot] have its own direct private party
claim ..." Id. at 4.
117. AviallServs., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520, at *13.
118. Id. at *8.
119. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 145 (5th Cir. 2001).
120. Id. at 144-45. Judge Weiner vehemently disagreed with this interpretation of contri-
bution, citing various secondary sources to show that civil action was not a prerequisite to
contribution. Id. at 148-49 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 145.
122. Id. at 149. Judge Weiner attacked the majority's "plain-meaning" statutory analysis,
presenting instead what he called a "full and fair reading" of § 113. Id. Judge Weiner goes on
to accuse the majority of "pervert[ing] ... statutory construction by seizing on and unduly
elevating the phrase 'during or following."' Id. at 145-46.
123. Aviall Servs. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 543
U.S. 157 (2004).
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administrative order-the so-called "federal common-law right to contribu-
tion."'24 The court relied on, among others, City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co. and Key Tronic Corp. v. United States as support for finding
the implied right to contribution in CERCLA.' 25 The court further reasoned
that the "federal common law right of contribution" survived the enactment
of § 13(f)(1) through the saving clause.'26 Additionally, the court looked at
the "may" and "during or following" provisions of § 1 13(f)(1) not as "shall"
or "may only.' 17 Instead, the court read the statutory language as meaning
that an action for contribution could-but was not required to-take place at
those times. 1
28
The decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Aviall provided
the Supreme Court with the issue discussed in this note: whether a PRP not
yet involved in litigation may sue another PRP for contribution.
129
IV. REASONING
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,' 3 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that Aviall could not sustain a claim under § 113(f)(1)
because Aviall had not been subject to a "civil action.'' 3 The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, began with a discussion of the
history of CERCLA and the facts and procedural posture surrounding the
case. 132 Then, the Court moved on with a textual analysis of the statute, find-
ing no uncertainty in the language of § 113(f)(1). 13 3 The Court declined to
rule on what would constitute a "civil action" under § 107(a) or § 106 be-
cause Aviall did not contend that it was subject to a civil action.'34 This left
only the issue of whether a PRP could obtain contribution in the absence of
a civil action. '3 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion,
which Justice John Paul Stevens joined. 36 Justice Ginsburg disagreed with
124. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Availl Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 164 (2004).
125. Aviall Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 682-83. In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that § 107 and § 113(0(1) have "similar and some-
what overlapping remed[ies]." 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
126. AviallServs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 687.
127. Id at 686-87.
128. Id
129. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 160-61.
130. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
131. Id at 166.
132. Id at 162-65.
133. Id at 167.
134. Id at 168.
135. Id.
136. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 171 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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the majority as to whether the Court should render judgment on Aviall's §
107 claim. '37
A. The Majority Opinion: Clarifying the Requirements for Contribution
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding that the
word "may," as used in § 113(f)(1), did not mean "may only."'38 First, the
Court explained that in looking at the language of the sentence itself, the
"natural meaning" of "may" would be that a § 113(f)(1) action for contribu-
tion could be brought only "during or following" a civil action.'39 Next, the
Court reasoned that if the statutory language that says a party "may" initiate
an action "during or following" a civil action was permissive, then it would
"render part of the statute entirely superfluous, something [the Court is]
loath to do."'4°
The Court recognized that the legislative intent behind placing an ex-
press right of contribution for PRPs in SARA was to confirm prior federal
court decisions authorizing contribution between PRPs.' 4' However, the
Court also recognized § 113(f)(1) as placing specific limitations upon when,
and under what circumstances, this right of contribution would occur.'42
Specifically, the Court held that the right of contribution provided by §
113(0(1) "may only" exist "during or following" a civil action. 43
The United States Supreme Court also disagreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the saving clause in § 113(f)(1), reasoning that the
sentence acted only to "rebut any presumption that the express right of con-
tribution provided by the enabling clause" is the PRP's only possible cause
of action.'" The Court explained that the saving clause was not, in and of
itself, a cause of action.'45 The Court further explained that the saving clause
did not expand the § 113(0(1) action for contribution to include actions that
were not "during or following" some civil action under § 107(a) or § 106. 46
137. Id. at 171-74.
138. Id. at 166 (majority opinion).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.
143. Id. The United States, as amicus curiae, also weighed in on the case on behalf of
Cooper. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-28, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543
U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192). The United States argued that the EPA's position on volun-
tary cleanup is that it must be done pursuant to a federal or state settlement agreement. Id.
When asked if the EPA had the time and resources to enter into settlement agreements with
all PRP volunteers, the United States responded that a state settlement agreement would be a
more likely route. Id.
144. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166-67.
145. Id. at 167.
146. Id
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Instead, the Court recognized that other causes of action may exist for PRPs
outside of § 113(f)(1), and § 113(f)(1) did not act to destroy those particular
causes of action.1
47
Although the Court held that a PRP could not obtain contribution
through § 113(f)(1), the Court declined to address the issue of whether Avi-
all could sue for cost recovery under § 107(a) or whether § 107(a) created an
"implied right of contribution."' 48 Consequently, the Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the lower court for a determi-
nation of whether Aviall could bring suit under § 107(a). 149
B. The Dissent: Allowing Recovery Under § 107
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court had already recog-
nized a PRP's ability to maintain a cost recovery action against other
PRPs.15° Justice Ginsburg noted that "no Justice" in the Key Tronic court
"expressed the slightest doubt that § 107[,] indeed[,] did enable a PRP to sue
other covered persons for reimbursement ... of cleanup costs the PRP le-
gitimately incurred. '15 Justice Ginsburg, however, did not argue whether
Aviall actually had a § 113(f)(1) claim. Instead, Justice Ginsburg disagreed
with any question as to whether Aviall should be able to bring its § 107 ac-
tion against Cooper." 2
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-
vices, Inc. has sent a chill through PRPs who now will be hesitant to under-
take a purely voluntary cleanup. 53 Subsequent lower court decisions will
147. Id.
148. Id. at 168. The Court recognized that its decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States contained dictum acknowledging that § 107(a) and § 113(0(1) were two separate but
similar remedies. Id. (citing 511 U.S. 809 (1994)). However, the Court was unwilling to
decide on that issue since it had not been pleaded by either party. Id, at 585.
149. Id. at 171. Aviall emphatically pleaded that, in the event its § 1 13(f)(1) claim failed,
the question of whether or not it could pursue a claim under § 107(a) should be preserved and
remanded to the Fifth Circuit. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 32.
150. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994)). In fact, the Key
Tronic Court said that "[§] 107 unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties
to seek recovery of cleanup costs." Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 818. The Court also rea-
soned that the "statute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113
and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107." Id. at 816.
Given that Key Tronic Corp. was a PRP, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court did not take
issue with the fact that Key Tronic Corp. was not an innocent party. Id. at 809.
152. Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 171-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. See Faulk & Bishop, supra note 83, at 324-25.
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indicate whether § 107(a) or some other alternate route under federal law is
available for the PRP who takes the initiative to clean up a contaminated site
prior to being the subject of a civil action. However, because of disagree-
ment among the various federal circuits, the time will likely come when the
Supreme Court must revisit the issue of voluntary cleanup. Parties may also
look to CERCLA-like state laws to provide a mechanism for cost recovery.
Whatever route parties take, the Court's decision in Cooper Industries, Inc.
v. Aviall Services, Inc. will likely curb voluntary cleanup actions throughout
the United States. The following section explores subsequent decisions by
lower federal courts concerning contribution pursuant to § 107(a), § 106,
and Arkansas's voluntary cleanup provisions.
A. Subsequent Decisions
1. Can a PRP Obtain Cost Recovery Through § 107(a)?
Since Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., there have been
several decisions by lower courts regarding contribution under CERCLA.
Recently, in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities,
Inc.,54 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. decision and denied a claim for contribution un-
der § 113(f)(3)(B) that was based upon a voluntary cleanup agreement be-
tween Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) and the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation. 5  The court held that an administrative agree-
ment absolving a party of liability under state law did not absolve a party
under CERCLA and, therefore, did not amount to an administrative settle-
ment under § 113(f)(3)(B). 56 In the absence of an administrative settlement
resolving Con Ed's CERCLA liability, a § 113 contribution claim was not
available.' 57 The court did, however, hold that Con Ed could maintain a
cause of action under § 107(a) for cost recovery. 5 ' The court reasoned that
because the United States Supreme Court had stated that § 107 and § 113
were similar but not the same, a separate right for cost recovery still ex-
isted.'59 The court went on to say that "[e]ach of those sections ... embodies
a mechanism for cost recovery available to persons in different procedural
circumstances."' 6 In determining whether Con Ed had a claim under §
154. No. 04-2409-CV, 2005 WL 2173585 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2005).
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id. at *3-5.
157. Id. at *4.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Id. at *6-7.
160. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 2005 WL 21735585, at *6.
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107(a), the court had to answer only "whether Con Ed is a 'person' and
whether it has incurred 'costs of response.""
'5 6'
Importantly, the court found no basis for distinguishing between parties
that were "innocent" and PRPs, and it held that, based upon the "quite sim-
ple language" of § 107(a), "any person" incurring costs related to cleanup of
a contaminated site can bring a § 107 cause of action. 62 The court recog-
nized important policy reasons for maintaining this § 107 action, particularly
the effect of discouraging voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites. 63 In the
absence of a viable method of cost recovery, parties would likely wait to be
sued rather than risk bearing the whole cost of site cleanup costs."6 In effect,
it would undermine "one of CERCLA's main goals, 'encourag[ing] private
parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup, by allowing them
to seek recovery from others."" 165
As recently as the summer of 2005, at least one author has argued that
§ 107(a) is not available for PRPs, as they would not fit into the category of
"other persons."'166 Based on the reasoning of Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., however, it seems that § 107(a) may
once again become a viable option for PRPs that have not been subject to
litigation.
161. Id. at *7.
162. Id. Interestingly, the Second Circuit indicated that § 107 cost recovery under
CERCLA may be unavailable to parties that had already been held liable or could become
liable due to pending litigation. Id. at *9. It appears that the court was distinguishing between
situations in which a party actually undertakes cleanup activities, making § 107 available to
them and situations in which a party may merely be on the hook monetarily for cleanup of a
contaminated site already undertaken by someone else. See id. at *9. It is plausible that in the
first instance, voluntary cleanup serves one of CERCLA's goals. In the second instance, that
of the tortfeasors being held liable for costs, the goal of voluntary cleanup is not furthered in
any significant way.
163. Id. at *7.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994)).
166. Win. Bradford Reynolds and Lisa K. Hsiao, The Right of Contribution Under
CERCLA After Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 346-47
(2005). Reynolds argued that "whether [§] 107(a) remains available to PRPs to pursue other
PRPs for contribution costs seems already to have been answered by the federal circuits with
an emphatic 'no."' Id. at 346. He also argued that a "reasonable interpretation" of § 107(a)
would lead one to conclude that PRPs are ineligible under § 107(a). Id. at 346-47. This seems
to be in direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in Consolidated Edison. While it is
true that through § 113(f)(1), § 107(a) recovery may ultimately be unavailable, it appears to
be viable for the purpose of PRP cost recovery actions. Reynolds does make an interesting
point in stating that "[p]urely voluntary cleanups of Superfund sites, without government
involvement or supervision, were never CERCLA's objective." Id. at 347. Again, however,
his comment appears to go against one of CERCLA's key goals: allowing parties undertaking
voluntary cleanup to recover costs from others (as expressed by the Key Tronic Corp. Court).
Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 818.
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There is still reason for plaintiff PRPs to fear, however, based upon a
quite different result recently coming out of the Seventh Circuit.167 In City of
Waukesha v. Viacom International, Inc.,68 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin upheld Seventh Circuit precedent that
only "innocent" parties have § 107(a) available to them. 169 The court held
that because the Cooper decision did not disturb Seventh Circuit decisions
holding that § 107(a) was unavailable to PRPs and because Cooper made §
113(f)(1) unavailable in the absence of civil action, PRPs undertaking vol-
untary cleanup had no means under CERCLA by which to obtain cost re-
covery. 17' The court cited a previous Seventh Circuit opinion in which it had
noted that "an innocent landowner could bring a claim for direct response
costs" against a PRP, but a "landowner who was a party liable in some
measure for the contamination must seek contribution under § 113(t). ' 17 1
In the near future, it appears that PRPs seeking recovery under § 107
absent a civil action will have a different result depending on what federal
circuit decides the case.
2. The § 113()(3) (B) Alternative
Administrative orders pursuant to § 106 provide an alternative to §
107(a) for PRPs to achieve contribution under § 113.72 Section 106 pro-
vides the government with the power to force parties to clean up contami-
nated sites through the use of administrative orders. 173 Section 113(f)(3)(B)
provides that parties to an administratively approved settlement may obtain
contribution from other PRPs that were not parties to the settlement.
74
Many PRPs, as well as-the EPA and Department of Justice, believed expen-
ditures made by a PRP to satisfy the requirements of a § 106 administrative
order were costs for which contribution claims would be available under §
113(f)(3)(B) as administrative settlements, thereby allowing PRPs a cause of
action against other non-settling PRPs. 175 In March of 2005, however, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois found that
an EPA administrative order did not satisfy § 113(f)(3)(B), reasoning that an
167. See City of Waukesha v. Viacom Int'l Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1028.
170. Id. at 1026.
171. Id. at 1028.
172. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000).
175. Telephone Interview with Alan Gates, Senior Partner, Mitchell, Williams, Selig,
Gates, and Woodyard (Oct. 20, 2005).
2006]
UALR LAW REVIEW
administrative order under § 106 did not pass as a settlement.'76 PRPs were
once again dealt a devastating blow in the area of voluntary cleanup, and
this time, with the help of the EPA, they searched for a solution that would
provide some predictability to judicial decisions.'77
In August of 2005, the EPA released a modified version of its model
administrative order for use by PRPs.178 In the model administrative order,
the EPA changed the name of the agreement to include "settlement.' ' 79 Ad-
ditionally, the EPA added the term "settlement" throughout the redlined
document.' The EPA also added the statement "constitutes an administra-
tive settlement ... for the purposes of CERCLA § 1 13(f)(3)(B)" to the
document."' 1 Specifically referencing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-
vices, Inc., the EPA maintained that its position-also the position of the
Department of Justice-was that the Administrative Order of Consent re-
solved a PRPs liability to the United States under a particular CERCLA
action and satisfied § 113(f)(3)(B) for the purpose of contribution. 8 2 How-
ever well-intentioned the EPA may have been, it remains to be seen whether
this new administrative order will be accepted by all federal circuits.
Equally devastating to the strength of the administrative order, the
court in Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chemical Acquisition LLC, also found
that an administrative order issued by the EPA did not satisfy the require-
ments for a civil action under § 113(f)(1). 3
B. Effects on Voluntary Cleanup in Arkansas
In addition to remedies under federal law, voluntary PRPs may also
look to state CERCLA-like laws in order to obtain contribution. 4 PRPs in
Arkansas, however, will have no such luck in the absence of state agency
intervention. 85 The Remedial Action Trust Fund Act (RATFA) is Arkan-
sas's version of the federal CERCLA. 6 RATFA allows "any person" to
176. Pharmacia Corp. & Solutia, Inc. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition L.L.C., No. 02-CV-
0428-MJR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286, at *23-24 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2005).
177. See Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, Director, Office of Site Remediation
Enforcement, United States Environmental Protection Agency 2-3 (Aug. 3, 2005) (on file
with author).
178. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 2-3.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 2.
183. Pharmacia Corp. & Solutia, Inc. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, L.L.C., No. 02-
0428-MJR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286, at *26 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2005).
184. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
185. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-520 (LEXIS 2000).
186. Id.
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obtain contribution for cleanup costs from other PRPs in "response to an
administrative or judicial order initiated" against them or "pursuant to an
administrative or judicially approved settlement.''8 7
In Reynolds Metal Co. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.,'88 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas strictly construed
the language and intent of RATFA to allow contribution only in the wake of
a state administrative or judicial order or settlement.' 89 The fact that Rey-
nolds Metal Company had entered into a settlement agreement with the
EPA, and not the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology,
did not change the result. 90
PRPs that are contemplating voluntary cleanup in Arkansas should
weigh their options carefully. Whether to rely on the EPA's new model ad-
ministrative order or seek some sort of settlement with the state depends
largely on what claims the PRP will carry into court. PRPs must be forward-
thinking and must carefully plan not only for the technical remediation as-
pects of the cleanup, but also for the requisite settlement agreement or ad-
ministrative order. PRPs may also consider trying to persuade the state envi-
ronmental department to file suit against them, thereby meeting the civil
action requirement of § 113(0(1).
VI. CONCLUSION
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., has left many PRPs
who have undertaken voluntary cleanup scrambling to determine how they
will be able to pursue a contribution claim under CERCLA against other
liable parties who have not paid their fair share of the response costs.' 9'
Short of a PRP actually being sued, there seems to be no bright-line rule
among the circuits for what meets the bar created in § 113(f)(1). Nor is there
any clear guidance as to whether a PRP that does not meet the requirements
of § 113(0(1) can prevail under § 107(a). By leaving open the possibility for
recovery under § 107(a), the United States Supreme Court has assured that
the question will again come before it. It is equally likely that the Court will
be called upon to address the sufficiency of EPA and state administrative
orders and settlements in meeting the requirements of § 113(0(1) and §
113(f)(3)(B). Perhaps the best alternative would be for Congress to clarify
its intent by amending CERCLA to provide less room for interpretation by
the courts. The current environment concerning voluntary cleanup is
summed up quite well through the words of one Little Rock attorney who
187. Id. §8-7-520(a)-(b).
188. 920 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
189. Id. at 998-99.
190. Id.
191. Telephone Interview with Alan Gates, supra note 175.
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recently stated, "[the voluntary cleanup process under CERCLA] has been
stabbed, if not through the heart, at least through the foot.
' ' 92
Chris Kinslow*
192. Id.
* J.D. expected May 2007; M.P.H., December 1999, Tulane University School of
Public Health and Tropical Medicine; B.S., May 1996, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
I thank my family for their smiles and encouragement. To Luckey, your love and understand-
ing enabled me to persevere through this phase of my life. I send a special thank you to Mr.
Alan Gates for acting as a fountain of knowledge from which I filed my canteen. Finally, I
thank the UALR Law Review for all that it has taught me during this journey.
[Vol. 28
